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Abstract
Classical and Connectionist theories of cognitive architecture seek to explain systematicity (i.e., the property of human
cognition whereby cognitive capacity comes in groups of related behaviours) as a consequence of syntactically and
functionally compositional representations, respectively. However, both theories depend on ad hoc assumptions to exclude
specific instances of these forms of compositionality (e.g. grammars, networks) that do not account for systematicity. By
analogy with the Ptolemaic (i.e. geocentric) theory of planetary motion, although either theory can be made to be
consistent with the data, both nonetheless fail to fully explain it. Category theory, a branch of mathematics, provides an
alternative explanation based on the formal concept of adjunction, which relates a pair of structure-preserving maps, called
functors. A functor generalizes the notion of a map between representational states to include a map between state
transformations (or processes). In a formal sense, systematicity is a necessary consequence of a higher-order theory of
cognitive architecture, in contrast to the first-order theories derived from Classicism or Connectionism. Category theory
offers a re-conceptualization for cognitive science, analogous to the one that Copernicus provided for astronomy, where
representational states are no longer the center of the cognitive universe—replaced by the relationships between the maps
that transform them.
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Introduction
For more than two decades, since Fodor and Pylyshyn’s seminal
paper on the foundations of a theory of cognitive architecture (i.e.,
roughly, the component processes and their modes of composition
that together comprise cognitive behaviour) [1], the problem of
explaining systematicity has remained unresolved [2] despite
numerous Classicist and Connectionist attempts [3–7]. In general
terms, the problem of systematicity for a theory of cognition is to
explain why various cognitive abilities are intrinsically connected
in the sense that the capacity to exhibit some abilities is indivisibly
linked to the capacity to exhibit some other related abilities. Why,
for example, is it the case that if one has the ability to infer that
John is the lover from John loves Mary, then one also has the ability
to infer that Mary is the lover from Mary loves John, where both
abilities involve a common relation, loves? That is to ask, in general:
what is it about our cognitive system that necessitates a particular
group-oriented distribution of cognitive capacities, whereby you
don’t find people with the capacity for some but not all the
behaviours pertaining to the same group (excluding, of course,
individuals who lack a particular capacity for reasons clearly
unrelated to normal development, because of brain damage for
example)? Although the debate over what systematicity implies for
a theory of cognition has many aspects (see [2]), the generally
accepted common ground is that: systematicity is a property of
some (though not all) components of human cognition; a complete
theory of human cognitive architecture must include an
explanation for this property; and no theory of cognition has a
satisfactory explanation for it. In the remainder of this section, we
outline the systematicity property and the main problem it still
poses for existing theories, what is required for a theory to explain
it, and how our approach meets those requirements.
The systematicity problem consists of three component
problems:
1. Systematicity of representation—why is it the case that the capacity
to generate some representations (e.g., the representation
John loves Mary) is intrinsically linked to the capacity to
generate some other representations (e.g., the representation
Mary loves John)?
2. Systematicity of inference—why is it the case that the capacity to
make some inferences (e.g., that John is the lover in the
proposition John loves Mary) is intrinsically linked to the
capacity to make some other inferences (e.g., that Mary is the
lover in the proposition Mary loves John)?
3. Compositionality of representation—why is it the case that the
capacity for some semantic content (e.g., the thought that
John loves Mary, however that thought may be represent-
ed) is intrinsically linked to the capacity for some other
semantic content (e.g., the thought that Mary loves John,
however that thought may also be represented)?
These problems are logically independent—one does not
necessarily follow from another [8], and so a theory is required
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one property may entail explanations for others.
Classicists and Connectionists employ some form of combina-
torial representations to explain systematicity. For Classicists,
representations are combined in such a way that the tokening of
complex representations entails the tokening of representations of
their constituent entities, so that the syntactic relationships
between the constituent representations mirror the semantics
ones—systematicity is a result of a combinatorial syntax and
semantics [1]. For Connectionists, representations of complex
entities are constructed more generally so that their tokening does
not necessarily imply tokening constituent entity representations
[5,6]. An example of a Classicist’s representation of John loves
Mary would be loves (John, Mary), and a Connectionist
representation would be a tensor product so that the vectors
representing John, loves, and Mary do not literally appear
anywhere in the tensor representation. We refer to the former as
classical compositionality, and the latter as connectionist (or, functional)
compositionality.
In general, a Classical or Connectionist architecture can
demonstrate systematicity by having the ‘‘right’’ collection of
grammatical rules, or functions such that one capacity is indivisibly
linked to another. Suppose, for example, a Classical system with
the following three rules:
G1:
P ? Agent loves Patient
Agent ? John D Mary
Patient ? John D Mary:
G1 provides the capacities to generate all four representations
(i.e., John loves John, John loves Mary, etc.), and these
capacities are indivisibly linked, because absence of any one of
those rules means the system cannot generate any of those
representations. In no case can the system generate one without
being able to generate the others. So, this Classical architecture
has the systematicity of representation property with respect to this
group of four propositions. A tensor product [9], or Go ¨del
numbering [5] scheme is a functionally compositional analogue of
this explanation. Systematicity of inference follows from having
additional processes that are sensitive to the structure of these
representations. For Classical architectures, at least, composition-
ality of representation also follows, because the semantic content of
a complex representation is built up from the semantic contents of
the constituents and their syntactic relationships [8]. Aizawa [2,8]
disputes whether a Connectionist architecture can also demon-
strate compositionality of representation. Regardless, though,
neither Classicism, nor Connectionism can derive theories that
provide a full account of systematicity [2].
A demonstration of systematicity is not an explanation for it. In
particular, although grammar G1 has the systematicity of
representation property, the following grammar:
G2:
P ? John loves Patient D Agent loves Mary
Agent ? John D Mary
Patient ? John D Mary
does not. This architecture cannot generate a representation of the
proposition Mary loves John even though it can generate
representations of both John and Mary as agents and patients,
and the John loves Mary proposition. The essential problem
for Classical theory—likewise Connectionist theory—is that
syntactic compositionality by itself is not sufficient without some
additional assumptions for admitting grammars such as G1 that
have the systematicity property, while excluding grammars such as
G2 that do not. An explanation for systematicity in these cases
turns on the nature of those additional, possibly ad hoc assumptions.
An explanatory standard for systematicity
To further clarify what is required of a theory to explain
systematicity [1,3], Aizawa [2] presents an explanatory standard
for systematicity and the problem of ad hoc assumptions, which we
follow, by analogy with the Ptolemean (geocentric) versus
Copernican (heliocentric) explanations for the motions of the
planets (see [10] for a review). The geocentric explanation for
planetary motion places the Earth at the center of the other
planets’ circular orbits. Although this theory can roughly predict
planetary position, it fails to predict periods of apparent retrograde
motion for the superior planets (i.e. Mars, Jupiter, etc.) across the
night sky without the assumption of epicycles (i.e., circular orbits
with centers that orbit the Earth). This additional assumption is ad
hoc in that it is unconnected with the rest of the theory and
motivated only by the need to fit the data—the assumption could
not be confirmed independently of confirming the theory. The
heliocentric explanation, having all planets move around the Sun,
eschews this ad hoc assumption. Retrograde motion falls out as a
natural consequence of the positions of the Earth and other planets
relative to the Sun. Tellingly, as more accurate data became
available, the geocentric theory had to be further augmented with
epicycles on epicycles to account for planetary motion; not so for
the heliocentric theory.
The theory of planetary motion, of course, does not end there.
The heliocentric theory, with its circular orbits, cannot explain the
elliptical motion of the planets without further assumptions, and so
was superseded by Newtonian mechanics. Newtonian mechanics
cannot explain the precession of planetary orbits, and was in turn
superseded by Einstein’s theory of relativity. In each case, the
superseding theory incorporates all that was explained by the
preceding theory. Evaluating competing theories in this manner
Author Summary
Our minds are not the sum of some arbitrary collection of
mental abilities. Instead, our mental abilities come in
groups of related behaviours. This property of human
cognition has substantial biological advantage in that the
benefits afforded by a cognitive behaviour transfer to a
related situation without any of the cost that came with
acquiring that behaviour in the first place. The problem of
systematicity is to explain why our mental abilities are
organized this way. Cognitive scientists, however, have
been unable to agree on a satisfactory explanation.
Existing theories cannot explain systematicity without
some overly strong assumptions. We provide a new
explanation based on a mathematical theory of structure
called Category Theory. The key difference between our
explanation and previous ones is that systematicity
emerges as a natural consequence of structural relation-
ships between cognitive processes, rather than relying on
the specific details of the cognitive representations on
which those processes operate, and without relying on
overly strong assumptions.
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a reasonable standard for an explanation of systematicity in
cognitive science.
Aizawa [2] notes that although philosophers of science may not
have a precise definition for the concept of an ad hoc assumption,
one can nonetheless usefully characterize the idea by analogy with
generally accepted examples, such as the assumption of epicycles,
which we just mentioned. Another example Aizawa uses is the
Creationist versus Darwinian theory of speciation, where the
appeal to a supernatural being to explain the existence of different
species is an ad hoc assumption. The general sense in which a
theory fails to provide a satisfactory explanation by its appeal to ad
hoc assumptions is when those additional, so called auxiliary,
assumptions are unconnected to the core assumptions and
principles of the theory, motivated only by the need to fit the
data, and cannot be confirmed independently of confirming the
theory. In this sense, the core theory has no explanatory power for
the particular phenomenon of interest. Note that an auxiliary
assumption is not necessarily ad hoc, nor is it precluded from
subsequent inclusion into the set of core assumptions of the
modified theory. Orthogonal experiments may provide confirma-
tory data for an auxiliary assumption, independent of the theory in
question. Observations of the Jovian moons would have been the
sort of independent confirmatory evidence for epicycles, had such
data been available at the time, to justifiably include it as one of
the core assumptions. However, the assumption that all heavenly
bodies are governed this way ultimately proved untenable. The
kind of theory sought here is one where systematicity necessarily
follows without requiring such ad hoc assumptions. This charac-
terization guides our analysis of the problem posed by the
systematicity property, and our explanation for it.
The problem for Classical and Connectionist theories is that
they cannot explain systematicity without recourse to their own ad
hoc assumptions [2]. For Classicism, having a combinatorial syntax
and semantics does not differentiate between grammars such as
G1 and G2. For Connectionism, a common recourse to learning
also does not work, whereby systematicity is acquired by adjusting
network parameters (e.g., connection weights) to realize some
behaviours—training set—while generalizing to others—test set.
Learning also requires ad hoc assumptions, because even widely
used learning models, such as feedforward [11] and simple
recurrent networks [12], fail to achieve systematicity [13–17] when
construed as a degree of generalization [18,19]. Hence, neither
Classical nor Connectionist proposals satisfy the explanatory
standard laid out by Fodor and Pylyshyn [1] and Fodor and
McLaughlin [3] (see also [20], Appendix), and further articulated
by Aizawa [2]. Ironically, failure to meet this criterion was one of
the reasons Classicists rejected Connectionist explanations for
systematicity. The import of Aizawa’s analysis is that the same
shortcoming also befalls Classicism, and so an explanation for
systematicity is still needed. In this regard, it would appear that the
90s were also the ‘‘lost decade’’ for cognitive science.
In hindsight, the root of the difficulty that surrounds the
systematicity problem has been that cognitive scientists never had
a theory of structure to start with (i.e. one that was divorced, or at
least separated from specific implementations of structure-sensitive
processes). In fact, such a theory has been available for quite some
time, but its relevance to one of the foundational problems of
cognitive science has not previously been realized. Our category-
theory based approach addresses the problem of ad hoc
assumptions because the concept of an adjunction, which is central
to our argument, ensures that the construct we seek not only exists,
but is unique. That is to say, from this core assumption and
category theory principles, the systematicity property necessarily
follows for the particular cognitive domains of interest, because in
each case the one and only collection of cognitive capacities
derived from our theory is the systematic collection, without
further restriction by additional (ad hoc) assumptions.
Methods
Category theory is a theory of structure par excellence [21–23]. It
was developed out of a need to formalize commonalities between
various mathematical structures [24], and has been used
extensively in computer science for the analysis of computation
[25–28]. Yet, despite computationalism being the catchcry of
many psychologists since the cognitive revolution, applications of
category theory to cognitive psychology have been almost non-
existent (but, see [29,30] for two examples). Our explanation of
systematicity is based on the concept of an adjunction, which
depends on the concepts of category, morphism, product, functor, and
natural transformation. So, in this section, we provide formal
definitions of these concepts. (For further explanation of some
category theory concepts in the context of cognition, see [30].)
An adjunction is a formal means for capturing the intuition that
a relationship between mathematical objects is ‘‘natural’’—
additional constructs are unnecessary to establish that relationship
(see also [23], p2). The mathematical notion of being natural dates
back at least to [24], and the technical aspect is given starting
where we define natural transformation. In the current context of
meeting the explanatory standard for systematicity, identifying a
suitable adjunction means that no further (ad hoc, or arbitrary)
assumptions are needed to define the relationship between a
particular cognitive architecture and a desired group of cognitive
capacities. Such constructs look natural (once understood), but it is
the mathematical criterion that definitely establishes naturality.
Category
A category C consists of a class of objects DCD~(A,B,...); a set
C(A,B) of morphisms (also called arrows, or maps) from A to B
where each morphism f : A?B has A as its domain and B as its
codomain, including the identitymorphism 1A : A?A for each object
A; and a composition operation, denoted ‘‘0’’, of morphisms
f : A?B and g : B?C,w r i t t e ng0f : A?C that satisfy the laws of:
N identity, where f01A~f~1B0f, for all f : A?B; and
N associativity,w h e r eh0(g0f)~(h0g)0f,f o ra l lf : A?B,
g : B?C and h : C?D.
The most familiar example of a category is Set, which has sets
for objects and functions for morphisms, where the identity
morphism 1A is the identity function and the composition
operation is the usual function composition operator ‘‘0’’. Another
example, where continuity is important, is the category of metric
spaces and continuous functions.
Morphisms
Certain morphisms have important properties that warrant
giving them names. Two such morphisms, which we will refer to
later, are called isomorphisms and homomorphisms. A morphism
f : A?B is an isomorphism if there exists a morphism g : B?A,
such that g0f~1A and f0g~1B.I fg exists, then it is the inverse of
f, also denoted as f {1.
Homomorphisms pertain to categories whose objects have
additional internal structure, such as groups. For example, the
category Grp has groups for objects, and the morphisms are group
homomorphisms. A group consists of a set G of elements, and an
associative binary operation  , satisfying identity and inverse
Categorial Compositionality
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an inverse element g{1[G, such that e   g~g~g   e and
g{1   g~e~g   g{1.Agroup homomorphism is a morphism
f : (G,   )?(H,#), such that f(g1   g2)~f(g1)#F(g2), for all
g1,g2[G. Homomorphisms in other categories (e.g., graph
homomorphisms) are defined analogously.
Product
A product of two objects A and B in a category C is an object P
together with two morphisms p1 : P?A and p2 : P?B, such that
for any pair of morphisms z1 : Z?A and z2 : Z?B, there is a
unique morphism u : Z?P, such that the following diagram
commutes:
where a broken arrow indicates that there exists exactly one
morphism making the diagram commute. To say that a diagram
commutes is to mean that the compositions along any two paths
with the same start object and the same finish object are the same.
So, in this diagram, z1~p10u and z2~p20u, where p1 and p2 are
sometimes called projection morphisms. A product object P is
unique up to a unique isomorphism. That is, for any other product
object P’ with morphisms p’1 : P’?A and p’2 : P’?B there is one
and only one isomorphism between P and P’ that makes a
diagram like this one commute. Hence, P is not unique, only
unique with respect to another product object via isomorphism.
This characteristic has an important consequence for our
explanation of systematicity, which we present in the Results
section. An essential characteristic of a product object is that the
constituents A and B are retrievable via the projection morphisms.
P is also written A|B, and since u is uniquely determined by z1
and z2, u is often written as Sz1,z2T, and the diagram used in
defining a product then becomes
In Set, P is (up to isomorphism) the Cartesian product (A|B,
p1 : (a,b).a, p2 : (a,b).b), where a[A, b[B, and u is the
product function Sz1,z2T : Z?A|B, sending x to (z1(x),z2(x)),
so that p10u~z1 and p20u~z2. The ‘‘maps to’’ arrow, .,
indicates the action of a function on a domain element, so f(a)~b
is equivalent to f : a.b.( A|B refers both to a general product
in any category with products and the more specific Cartesian
product in the category Set.)
The categorical concept of product is a very general notion of
combinatoriality. Not surprisingly, then, Classical and Connec-
tionist notions of combinatorial i t yc a nb es e e na ss p e c i a lc a s e so f
categorical products. A grammar like G1 (Introduction), for
instance, can be used to realize the Cartesian product of the set
of agents and the set of patients (i.e. by employing the first
production without the loves symbol). A categorical product
can also be realized by including suitable rules for inferring the
agent and patient from this Cartesian product. (A grammar like
G2 cannot realize a Cartesian product, or categorical product;
in fact, it realizes a union of two partial products.) Similarly, a
Connectionist method such as the outer product of two vector
spaces with suitable projections from the outer product space to
the original vector spaces also realizes a categorical product.
However, an explanation for systematicity requires more than
just realization, and as we shall see, additional category theory
concepts are needed.
Functor
A functor F : C?D is a structure-preserving map between
categories C and D that associates each object A in C to an object
F(A) in D; and each morphism f : A?B in C to a morphism
F(f) : F(A)?F(B) in D, such that F(1A)~1F(A) for each object
A in C; and F(g0Cf)~F(g)0DF(f) for all morphisms f : A?B
and g : B?C for which compositions 0C and 0D are defined in
categories C and D, respectively. The following diagram shows the
details of a functor:
where dashed rectangles encapsulate the categories, and arrows
between morphisms are omitted. The object and morphism
components of a functor are sometimes explicitly distinguished as
F0 and F1, respectively. Otherwise, the functor component is
implicitly identified by its argument.
Functor composition and isomorphism are defined analogously
to morphisms (above). That is, the composition of functors
F : C?D and G : D?E is the functor G0F : C?E, sending all
objects A in C to objects G0F(A) in E; and morphisms f : A?B
in C to morphisms G0F(f) : G0F(A)?G0F(B), such that identity
and composition are respected. That is, G0F(1A)~1G0F(A); and
G0F(g0Cf)~(G0F(g))0E(G0F(f)). A functor F : C?D is an
isomorphic functor, if and only if there exists a functor G : D?C
such that G0F~1C and F0G~1D, where 1C and 1D are the
identity functors sending objects and morphisms to themselves in
the respective categories.
Theories of cognition employ some form of representation.
Functors provide a theoretical basis for constructing representa-
tions. For example, computational systems often employ lists of
items, such as numbers. In category theory, lists can be modeled as
monoids from the category Mon whose objects are monoids, and
morphisms are monoid homomorphisms [28]. A monoid (M,:, ) is
a set M, with an associative binary operation :, and an identity
element , such that m: ~m~ :m for all m[M.Alist monoid
(S ,:, ) [28] is the set S  of all ordered lists constructed from set S
by concatenation operator :, where the identity element is the
empty list (so that, e.g., ½1,2 : ~½1,2 ). (It is worth noting that
strings, e.g., lists of characters, of length 2 over the set S are
ð1Þ
ð3Þ
ð2Þ
Categorial Compositionality
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science,   often means ‘‘match anything’’, hence the notation S 
can be read as strings of any length n§0.) Lists can be constructed
from sets by the functor List : Set?Mon, as indicated in the
example diagram
where lists is the object part of List (i.e., List0~lists) and maplist is
the morphism part (i.e., List1~maplist), so that, e.g.,
maplist : sqr . sqrlist (i.e., morphism sqr is mapped to monoid
homomorphism maplist(sqr), which we will refer to as sqrlist). (For
simplicity, we have omitted composition with a second morphism in
each of the categories and functor mappings, as was shown in
Diagram 3.) So, for example, sqrlist(½1,2 :½3 )~sqrlist(½1,2,3 )~
½1,4,9 ~½1,4 :½9 ~sqrlist(½1,2 ):sqrlist(½3 ). The examples pertain-
ing to lists were adapted from [28] (Chapter 2), where L(S) in [28]
corresponds to our S . We choose to label the object component of
the functor lists rather than list to emphasize the fact that the
functor constructsa setoflistsofnumbers from asetofnumbers,not
just a single list containing those numbers.
The two different sorts of arrows in Diagrams 3 and 4 highlight
the constructive nature of functors. The objects are (co)domains
with respect to the morphisms within categories, but are
themselves elements of larger objects (in general, the class DCD)
with respect to the morphisms between categories. In programmer
parlance, sqr was ‘‘lifted’’ from being a function over numbers to
become a function sqrlist over lists of numbers. In this way,
functors provide a means for constructing new representations and
processes from existing ones in a structurally consistent manner.
Notice that the definition of functor does not dictate a particular
choice for monoid homomorphism as part of the definition of List.
A natural choice is to define maplist(f) so that functions applied to
one-item lists result in one-item lists (i.e., maplist(f) : ½x .½f(x) ).
Another choice that turns out to also respect the definition of a
functor includes two copies of each transformed element (i.e.,
maplist’(f) : ½x1,...,xn .½f(x1),f(x1),...,f(xn),f(xn) ). In this
case,
maplist0(f)(½x1,...,xn :½y1,...,ym )
~maplist0(f)(½x1,...,xn,y1,...,ym )
~½f(x1),f(x1),...,f(xn),f(xn),f(y1),f(y1),...,f(ym),f(ym) 
~½f(x1),f(x1),...,f(xn),f(xn) :½f(y1),f(y1),...,f(ym),f(ym) 
~maplist0(f)(½x1,...,xn ):maplist0(f)(½y1,...,ym ):
So, maplist’(f) and in particular sqrlist’: ½x1,...,xn .½x2
1,x2
1,...,
x2
n,x2
n  are monoid homomorphisms. In fact, there are many
possible monoid homomorphisms that could be chosen to define this
functor. Consequently, in the case of an architectural component of a
cognitive system, there are many possible ways of constructing
structurally consistent representations and processes from existing
ones. We need to find a principled way to choose the ‘‘right’’ monoid
homomorphism. In the context of explaining systematicity, a similarly
principled choice is necessary. To narrow the choice down to a
particular monoid homomorphisms, and hence a particular represen-
tational scheme, we need two additional category theory concepts:
natural transformation and adjunction.
Natural transformation
A natural transformation g : F?G is a structure-preserving
morphism from domain functor F : C?D to codomain functor
G : C?D that consists of D{maps gA : F(A)?G(A) for each
object A in C, such that G(f)0gA~gB0F(f), as indicated by the
commutative diagram in the category D
Again for expository purposes, we include the source category
and functor arrows, which are usually left implicit in such
diagrams. When a transformation is natural in the technical sense
it seems natural in the intuitive sense, for mathematicians. In fact,
category theory was founded in an attempt to formalize such
intuitions [24]. We will return to this point about naturality, in the
Discussion, as it pertains to an explanation of systematicity without
reliance on ad hoc assumptions.
A natural transformation is a natural isomorphism,o rnatural
equivalence if and only if each gA is an isomorphism. That is, for
each gA : F(A)?G(A) there exists a g{1
A : G(A)?F(A) such that
g{1
A 0gA~1F(A) and gA0g{1
A ~1G(A). Natural transformations also
compose, and the composition of two natural transformations is
also a natural transformation. Just as there are identity morphisms
mapping objects to themselves, and identity functors mapping
categories to themselves, there are also identity natural transfor-
mations, iF : F?F, mapping functors to themselves. And, so, the
composition of a natural isomorphism (isomorphic natural
transformation), g : F?G, with its inverse, g{1 : G?F,i sa n
identity natural transformation, i.e., iF~g0g{1.
Functors preserve structure between categories; natural trans-
formations identify the similarities between functors. For our
purposes, functors construct new representations and processes
from existing ones; natural transformations identify the similarities
between constructions. A simple example that is closely related to
the List functor example, illustrating this perspective, involves list
reversal as indicated by the commutative diagram
where the domain and codomain objects of each morphism are
sets of lists, such as f1,2,3g
 ; and sqrl is essentially sqrlist with
ð4Þ
ð5Þ
ð6Þ
Categorial Compositionality
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diagram illustrates, squaring a reversed list is the same as reversing
a squared list. So, there is a non-trivial (i.e. non-identity)
relationship between the list monoid construction functor (List)
and itself. The functor Lst : Set?Set constructing the lists in
Diagram 6 is closely related to List : Set?Mon in that the
returned object S  is just the underlying set of the monoid (S ,:, ),
forgetting the binary operation : and the identity element. The
underlying set can also be extracted by a functor from the category
Mon, as we will see in the next section. This example shows how
two ways of constructing individual lists, via the Lst functor, are
related by the list reversal natural transformation, rev.
Although their associated diagrams look similar, there is an
important difference between functor and natural transformation
pertaining to the equality constraint that defines the relationships
between object elements. For a functor, the equality constraint is
local to the codomain of the transformation, i.e. the relationships
between object elements within the constructed category. And so,
the elements of the objects in the new category are only indirectly
related to the elements in the corresponding objects of the source
category by the categories’ common external structure (i.e. inter-
object relationships). For a natural transformation, the equality
constraint spans the transformation, involving object elements
mapped by both domain and codomain functors. And so, the two
functors are directly related to each other by the internal structure
of their associated objects (i.e. the relationships between object
elements within an object). As part of a theory of cognitive
architecture, there is a tension between the freedom afforded by
functorial construction on the one hand—allowing an architecture
to transcend the specific details of the source elements to realize a
variety of possible representational schemes for those elements—
and the need to pin down such possibilities to specific referents on
the other. This tension is resolved with adjunctions.
Adjunction
An adjunction consists of a pair of functors F : C?D, G : D?C
and a natural transformation g: 1C?(G0F), such that for every
C{object X and C{map f : X?G(Y) there exists a unique
D{map g : F(X)?Y, such that f~G(g)0gX, indicated by the
following commutative diagram:
where the functors are implicitly identified by (co)domain
categories C (left subdiagram) and D (right subdiagram). The
two functors are called an adjoint pair, (F,G), where F is the left
adjoint of G, and G is the right adjoint of F; and natural
transformation g is called the unit of the adjunction.
The left and right functors of an adjoint pair are like ‘‘inverses’’ of
each other, but unlike an isomorphic functor whose composition
with its inverse sends all objects and morphisms to themselves, the
returnedobjectsandtheirelementsofacompositionofleftandright
adjoints are related to the argument (source) objects and their
elements by a natural transformation. For categories Set and Mon,
the adjoint pair (F,U), consisting of functor F : Set?Mon that
constructs the free monoid F(S) on the set S, and then ‘‘forgetful’’
functor U : Mon?Set returns the underlying set S  of monoid
F(S),arerelated byaninjection. The injectioniscalledaninsertionof
generators, whose component at S, iS : S?S , sends each element of
S to the corresponding element (one-item list) in S . The elements
iS(s) together generate the set S  (i.e. S is the alphabet from which
the set S  of all ‘‘words’’ is constructed where each s[S is mapped
to ½s [S ). In this context, iS : S?S  is the unit of this adjoint pair.
The effect of F on objects has just been given; the effect on
morphisms is as follows: if a : S?T is a function, then
a  : S ?T  is defined as follows:
a ( S)~ T
a (s1,...,sn)~a(s1),...,a(sn), Vs1,...,sn[S
(cf. [25], p.111–112). Note that F is the functor List defined in the
Functors section.
Monoid F(S) is ‘‘free’’ in the informal sense that there are no
missing or extra bits in the construction used to satisfy
commutativity. The precise definition of free is as follows. Given
the forgetful functor U, and an object S of Set, F(S) is free on S if
there is a morphism iS : S?U0F(S) such that for any morphism
f : S?U(M), there exists a unique morphism g : F(S)?M such
that f~U(g)0iS, indicated in the following commutative diagram:
However, not just any monoid generated from a set is a free
monoid. For instance, the monoid (f0,1g,z,0) (i.e. addition
modulo 2) in the diagram
is not the free monoid on any set S, because the only
homomorphism, g : (f0,1g,z,0)?(N,z,0), maps 0 and 1 to
0[N, which does not make the diagram commute for f : x.1.
That is, U(g)0iS(x)~0=1~f(x). (It is easy to show that the free
monoid on the empty set is f0g.S of0,1g is not the free monoid
on the empty set, either.) Other free objects, such as the free group
on a set are defined analogously (see [21]). A simple example of a
free monoid as may be employed by a cognitive system is a
primitive form of counting, where (f1g
 ,:, ) is the free monoid
counter, having elements f ,½1 ,½1,1 ,½1,1,1 ,...g, on singleton set
f1g. This monoid is isomorphic to addition over the natural
numbers, i.e. the monoid (N,z,0).
From free objects we get an alternative (equivalent) definition of
adjunction: consider functor G : D?C from the original defini-
tion. If for every object X [ DCD, F(X) is free on X with morphism
gX, then functor F : C?D, with morphism mappings defined so
that G(F(f))0gX~gY0f, is the left adjoint of G, and G is the right
adjoint of F [31].
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category theorists for its conceptual elegance, highlights the
symmetry between a pair of adjoint functors: a bijection (one-to-
one correspondence) between the set of morphisms from object
F(X) to Y in category D and the set of morphisms from object X
to G(Y) in category C. So, identifying the unique morphism in
one category means that it is associated with one and only one
morphism in the other category.
In the list construction example, the unit of the adjunction is the
injection i : x.½x  sending each element x in the set S to the one-
item list ½x  in the set of all lists S  constructed from S, as shown in
the following diagram:
where the left adjoint, F : Set?Mon, constructs the free monoid
(S ,:, ) on the set S; and the right adjoint, U : Mon?Set,r e t u r n s
the underlying set, S , of a list monoid, as mentioned earlier. In this
way, given i0f : x.½f(x) , the only homomorphism in the
constructed category making the diagram commute is
maplist(f) : ½x1,...,xn .½f(x1),...,f(xn) . The definition for
arrow mapl(f) is essentially the same as maplist(f),e x c e p tt h a ti t s
(co)domain is a set, not a monoid. Other monoid homomorphisms
that could have been chosen as part of the List functor definition,
such as maplist’(f) : ½x1,...,xn .½f(x1),f(x1),...,f(xn),f(xn) ,
are excluded by i0f : x.½f(x)  and the commutativity property of
the adjunction, because mapl’(f)0i(x)~mapl’(½x )~½f(x),f(x) =
½f(x) ~i0f(x).
Since this arrangement works for any morphism in Set, it can
also be used to define a particular list length function from a family
of analogous ‘‘length’’ functions as indicated in the following
commutative diagram:
where monoid (N,z,0) is the set of non-negative integers with
addition as the operator and 0 as the identity element; 1 : S?N is
a constant function sending every element to the number 1; and
len/length are functions returning the number of items in a list.
As in the previous example, the definition of functor affords other
choices for ‘‘length’’, such as length’ : L.2|length(L), where L
is a list. This arrow is also a monoid homomorphism, since
length’(L1:L2)~2|(n1zn2)~(2|n1)z(2|n2)~length’(L1)z
length’(L2), where n1 and n2 are the lengths of lists L1 and L2,
respectively. Again, however, the morphism 1 : S?N and the
commutativity property force the usual choice for length function
(i.e. len), and excludes others such as len’, because len’0i(x)~
len’(½x )~2=1~1(x).
A general pattern emerges from this use of adjunction. Functor
construction may afford multiple choices for particular morphisms
(processes) in the constructed category, but a principled choice is
obtained through the commutativity property of the adjunction.
This arrangement means that we are not committed a priori to a
particular representational scheme; i.e., we do not have to make
an ad hoc assumption about what that representational format
should be. Given that an architecture has the capacity for an
instance of the group of computations under consideration, then
necessarily it applies to all other computations in that group. In the
case of list length, for example, len’ may indeed be the ‘‘correct’’
choice when we require the length of a list of characters in number
of bytes for characters that are 2-byte unicodes (i.e. the characters
appearing in the extended set that includes other special symbols
and language scripts requiring two bytes for unique identification).
So, to paraphrase, a computational architecture with the capacity
to count the length (in bytes) of some lists of 2-byte unicodes
necessarily has the capacity to compute byte lengths for all other
unicode lists. In this way, the explanation for the ‘‘systematicity of
list length’’ has two parts: existence is afforded by the possible list
length functions; and uniqueness is afforded by the commutativity
property of the adjunction. Without the adjunction, the choice of
construction is by ad hoc assumption. Our explanation for the
systematicity of human cognition follows this pattern.
Results
With these formal concepts in hand, we now proceed to our
explanation of systematicity. We apply our explanation in two
domains: systematicity with respect to relational propositions, and
systematicity with respect to relational schemas. Then, we contrast
our explanation with the Classical and Connectionist ones.
Systematicity of relational propositions: (diagonal,
product) adjoint
For expository purposes, we develop our adjoint functors
explanation from its components. One may wonder whether a
simpler category theory construct would suffice to explain
systematicity. For this example domain, the components of this
adjoint have some systematicity properties, but in and of
themselves do not explain systematicity—just as for Classicism
and Connectionism, having a property is not the same as
explaining it. This bottom-up approach motivates the more
complex category theory construct from which the systematicity
properties necessarily follow. Our approach has three steps. First,
we show a categorical product that has the systematicity of
representation and systematicity of inference properties. However,
a product of two objects may afford many isomorphic product
objects that do not also have the compositionality of representation
property. Second, we show that the product functor provides the
principled means for constructing only those products that also
have the compositionality of representation property. There may,
however, be several products that have the compositionality
property, but which differ in semantic content by having different
orders between identical sets of constituents. So, a principled
choice is needed to determine the product. So, third, we show that
the diagonal functor, which is left adjoint to the product functor,
provides that principled choice by the commutativity property of
the (diagonal, product) adjoint functor pair. For concreteness, we
refer to the category Set, but our explanation does not depend on
this category.
(If we require an explanation of systematicity with respect to
ternary relational propositions, then a ternary product
(A|B|C,p1,p2,p3) is employed. The explanation for systematicity
extendsanalogously, wherethediagonaland productfunctorsinvolve
object triples. We may also need to explicitly represent a symbol for a
relation, such as Loves. In this case, an object representing the
relation symbol is paired with the product object representing the
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present purposes, we omit relation symbols, since the relation is
constant across the instances considered here and nothing essentially
changes by its omission.
First, suppose objects A (say, agents) and B (patients) are sets
containing representations of John and Mary, denoted as fJ, Mg.
Although A and B are the same set of members, we maintain distinct
names to keep track of the distinction between member pairs. (The
assignment of elements to objects is itself an assumption, but not an ad
hoc one for our theory, as explained in the next section and in the
Discussion.) A categorical product of these two sets is the Cartesian
product of A and B, which is the set of all pairwise combinations of
elements from A and B, together with projections p1 and p2
for retrieving the first and second constituents in each case.
That is, A|B~f(J, J),(J, M),(M, J),(M, M)g, p1 : (a,b) . a,a n d
p2 : (a,b) . b. By definition, the Cartesian product A|B generates
all pairwise combinations of elements from A and B, therefore this
Cartesian product has the systematicity of representation property.
Moreover, by definition, the categorical product (A|B,p1,p2) affords
the retrieval of each constituent from each representation (otherwise it
is not a product), therefore the categorical product also has the
systematicity of inference property. In this case, Z from the categorical
product definition takes the role of input, so in terms of Diagram 2
inferring John as the lover from John loves Mary is just
z1(JM)~p10u(JM),w h e r eJM is the input and u is the input-to-
product object map, whose unique existence is guaranteed by
definition.
The Cartesian product, however, is not the only product object
that satisfies the definition of a categorical product of A and B.A n
alternative product has P~f1,2,3,4g as the product object, and
p’1 : 1.J,2.J,3.M,4.M and p’2 : 1.J,2.M,3.J,4.M as
the projections. Indeed, for this example, any four-item set together
with the appropriate projections for retrieving the constituents
would suffice. However, these alternatives do not have the
compositionality of representation property: the semantic contents
of these representations, whatever they may be, are not systemat-
ically related to each other, or the semantic content of John,o r
Mary. Hence, categorical products, in themselves, do not
necessarily provide an explanation of systematicity.
Second, for any category C that has products (i.e. every pair of
objects in C has a product), one can define a product functor
P : C|C?C (or, P : C|C|C?C, in the ternary case), that is
from the Cartesian product of categories, C|C, itself a category,
to C, where P0 : (A,B) . A|B, P1 : (f,g) . f|g, as indicated
by the following diagram:
recalling that our functor diagrams explicitly identify the object
component, P0, but not the morphism component, P1, of the
functor. In this case, the semantic contents of these elements are
systematically related to each other and their constituents John
and Mary. This categorical construction is an instance of Classical
compositionality, whereby the constituents ai[A, bj[B are
tokened wherever the compositions (ai,bj)[A|B are tokened.
As such, it has the compositionality of representation property.
Although the product functor has the compositionality of
representation property, it introduces a different problem:
(B|A,p’2,p’1), where p’2 : (b,a).a and p’1 : (b,a).b is also a
valid product, but the semantic content of (a,b) is not the same as
(b,a). That is because they have different order relationships
between their constituents even though the corresponding
constituents are identical. Thus, a principled choice is required
to determine whether, for example, John loves Mary should
map to (John, Mary), or (Mary, John). Otherwise, one can
define an architecture that does not have the systematicity of
inference property by employing both products to correctly infer
Johnas the lover in John loves Mary via (A|B,p1, p2), yet
incorrectly infer John as the lover in Mary loves John via
(B|A,p’2,p’1), where position within the product triple identifies
the relevant projection. The assumption that architectures employ
only the first product is ad hoc just like the assumption that Classical
architectures employ grammars such as G1, but not G2. So, a
principled choice is needed to determine the product.
Third—final step, this problem brings us to the second aspect of
our explanation foreshadowed in the Introduction (i.e. unique-
ness). Again, as we saw with lists, a particular construction is
specified through the left adjoint functor. The left adjoint to the
product functor is the diagonal functor D : C?C|C (or,
D : C?C|C|C, in the ternary case), where D0 : A.(A,A),
D1 : f .(f,f) as indicated by the following diagram:
The (diagonal, product) adjoint pair is indicated by the
following commutative diagram:
(see [28] Example 2.4.6). In this manner, the John loves Mary
family of cognitive capacities is specified by the commutative
diagram
where ag and pt are the agent and patient maps from the set of
proposition inputs Pr into the set S~A~B containing all the
possible constituent representations.Here, weexplicitly consider the
case of equality, so that A|B~B|A~S|S. When A=B,
ag|pt and pt|ag have different codomains, since A|B=B|A,
so the conflict between these products does not come into play,
therefore the adjunction is not required and the product functor is
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maintain the notational distinction for clarity in the subsequent text.
Given Sag,ptT as the morphism used by the architecture to map
proposition inputs to their corresponding internal representations,
then the definition of an adjunction guarantees that (ag,pt) is uni-
que with respect to making Diagram 15 commute via ag|pt.T h a t
is, (ag|pt)0S1Pr,1PrT(JM)~(ag|pt)(JM,JM)~(John,Mary)~
Sag,ptT(JM), where JM is the input for proposition John
loves Mary. The alternative construction pt|ag is exclud-
ed because (pt|ag)0S1Pr,1PrT(JM)~(pt|ag)(JM,JM)~ (Mary,
r =(John,Mary)~Sag,ptT(JM).H a v i n ge x c l u d e dpt|ag by the
commutativityproperty oftheadjunction,the onlytwo remaining ways
to map the other inputs (i.e. Sag,ptT and (ag|pt)0S1Pr,1PrT)a r e
equal. So, given that the architecture can represent John loves
Mary as (John, Mary) via Sag,ptT and infer John as the lover via
p1 from the product (A|B,p1,p2), then necessarily it can represent
Mary loves John and infer Mary as the lover using the same
morphisms. That is, p10Sag,ptT(MJ)~p1(Mary, John)~Mary,
or p10(ag|pt)0S1Pr,1PrT(MJ)~p10(ag|pt)(MJ,MJ)~p1(Mary,
John)~Mary.
This explanation works regardless of whether proposition John
loves Mary is represented as (John, Mary) via Sag,ptT,o r
(Mary, John) via Spt,agT. In the latter case, the adjunction picks
out just the construction (pt,ag), and hence pt|ag, because it is
the one and only one that makes the following diagram commute:
That is, (pt|ag)0S1Pr,1PrT(JM)~(pt|ag)(JM, JM)~(Mary,
John)~Spt,agT(JM), but (ag|pt)0S1Pr,1PrT(JM)~(ag|pt)(JM,
JM)~(John,Mary)=(Mary,John)~Spt,agT(JM). Given that the
architecture can represent John loves Mary as (Mary, John)
via Spt,agT and infer John as the lover via p’2 from the product
(B|A,p’2,p’1), then necessarily it can do so for Mary loves
John using the same morphisms. That is, p’20Spt,agT(MJ)
~p’2(John, Mary)~Mary,o rp’20(pt|ag)0S1Pr,1PrT(MJ)~
p’20(pt| ag)(MJ,MJ)~p’2(John,Mary)~Mary.
Explicit (multiple) relational propositions
If we need to explicitly represent a symbol for a relation, such as
Loves, the product object is paired with an object, say RL,
representing the context in which the entities are related. The
object representing the relation in this case is (RL,A|B). This
situation may arise where we need an explanation for systematicity
that involves multiple similar relations, e.g., loves, likes, dislikes, and
hates, where the capacity for instances of each of these relationships
is co-extensive. That is, if one can represent John loves Mary
and John likes Mary, then one can also represent the other six
combinations, such as Mary loves John and Mary likes
John. If one can represent John loves Mary, but not John
likes Mary, then one can represent Mary loves John, but
not Mary likes John. In this case, there is a category R of
relation symbols whose objects, Ri, are symbols referring to each
relation (e.g., loves, likes, etc.), and whose morphisms, 1Ri, are just
the identity morphisms for each object. (Such a category is called a
discrete category.) Each relation, in this case, is a pair (Ri,A|B).
Hence, the capacity to represent instances of the loves and likes
relations extends to the other instances for both relations.
For these situations, the diagonal and product functors have
extensions. The extension to the diagonal functor is:
D
  : R|C?R|(C|C),s u c ht h a tD
 
0 : (Ri,C).(Ri,(C,C)) and
D
 
1: (1Ri,f).(1Ri,(f,f)). The product functor is: P  : R|
(C|C)?R|C,s u c ht h a tP 
0 : (Ri,(C,D)).(Ri,C|D) and
P 
1: (1Ri,(f,g)).(1Ri,f|g).T h ea d j u n c t i o n ,w h i c hi sa ne x t e n s i o n
of the one shown in Diagram 15, is shown in the following
commutative diagram:
In this situation, Ri provides the explicit context in which
entities are related.
Under the assumption that these relation symbols belong to a
different category, then cases such as loves loves loves
cannot be generated. Note that supposing different objects for
these entities is not an ad hoc assumption for our theory. R does not
contain members such as John or Mary, and likewise A (or, B)
does not contain relation symbols, because they refer to different
types of entities with respect to the theory—Loves refers to a
relation, which is at the level of objects in our theory, whereas
John and Mary refer to entities in a relationship, which are
members of objects.
Summary
In summary, products may have the systematicity of represen-
tation and inference properties (see also Discussion), but may not
have the compositionality of representation property. Product
functors construct products that have the compositionality
property, but there may be more than one product with this
property. The possible presence of multiple products requires a
principled choice for fixing the product. That choice is provided by
the (diagonal, product) adjoint functor pair. Importantly, the unit
of the adjunction, S1Pr,1PrT, is not a free parameter of the
explanation, it defines the specific adjunction in part; and there is
no choice in representational format (i.e. left-right, or right-left
constituent order)—the given capacity to represent a proposition
fixes the same order for all the other propositions. The same
situation also applies for the explicit (multiple) relational
propositions domain. Hence, systematicity is a necessary conse-
quence of this (extended) adjoint pair without recourse to ad hoc
assumptions, and so meets the explanatory standard set by Aizawa
[2], and Fodor and Pylyshyn [1], for this domain.
Systematicity of relational schemas: (free, forgetful)
adjoint
Another domain in which humans exhibit systematicity is
relational schema induction. This domain is more complex than
the previous one in that the intrinsic connection is between
relations, rather than within one. In the relational schema
induction paradigm [32], participants are required to do cue-
response prediction over a set of stimuli, such as letters and shapes,
whose relationships conform to a group-like structure. For
example, participants are shown (trigram, shape) pairs generated
from a set of four trigrams (e.g., NEJ, POB, KEF, BEJ) and two
shapes (e.g., square, circle), and are required to predict the
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example, a participant is presented with NEJ and square. After
making a prediction, the correct response trigram is presented.
This procedure is repeated with a new cue-response trial. The first
two responses are not predictable prior to the feedback provided
by the correct trigram. Hence, the first two trials are regarded as
‘‘information’’ trials. Each block of eight trials (i.e. all possible
trigram-shape combinations) is repeatedly presented until a certain
criterion level of correct performance is reached (e.g., correct
responses to all eight trials in a block). Each set of eight cue-
response pairs (i.e., four trigram times two shapes) constitutes a
task instance. Once participants reach criterion a new task
instance of eight cue-response pairs was randomly generated from
a larger pool of possible trigrams and shapes (task instance
examples are shown in Tables 1 and 2). The crucial data for this
paradigm are the performances on subsequent task instances.
When subsequent task instances conformed to the same structure,
albeit with different stimuli, mean response error over the 48
participants was at or near optimal level: 2.00 errors per eight
trials for the sequence of task instances conforming to the Klein
group, and 2.67 for task instances conforming to the cyclic-4
group—two information trials are needed to determine the
assignment of novel stimuli to structural elements [32]. The
results provide another example of systematicity of human
cognition: given that a person can correctly do one task instance
and the information trials from the new task instance, then
necessarily they can predict trials of all others, with the usual
provision for a distinction between competence and performance.
This task is modelled as the category of sets with actions, ASet (cf.
[25], 6.3.1, and [33] Definition 5.2), that has objects (Q,X,d) for
task instances, where Q is a set of states indicated by trigrams, X is
a set of ‘‘actions’’ indicated by shapes, and d : Q|X?Q specifies
the action of a shape on a trigram resulting in a trigram. The
morphisms (g,r) : (Q,X,d)?(R,Y,c) in this category consist of
pairs of maps g : Q?R and r : X?Y, such that the following
diagram commutes:
where the identity morphism 1Q,X,d is the pair of identity maps
(1Q,1X), and compositions are defined component-wise. In our
example, the set Q consists of four elements representing the four
trigrams, and the set X consists of two elements representing the
two shapes.
For the purpose of finding a suitable adjoint, we need to see how X
is naturally embedded in a monoid. Recall that a monoid (M,:, )
consists of a set M and a binary associative operator : that satisfies
closure: i.e., for all a,b [ M,a:b [ M,w h e n e v e ra:b is defined, and
there is an identity element [ M,s u c ht h a t :m~m~m: .I nt e r m s
of our ASets (i.e. objects in ASet), the monoid identity corresponds to
a ‘‘shape’’ whose action is to do nothing at all to the trigrams on
which it acts: it leaves them unchanged. (However, this shape was not
included in the experiments [32].)
The adjoint functor pair used for this domain consists of the
forgetful functor U : ASet?Set|Set, which returns the underlying
sets, i.e. U0 : (Q,X,d) . (Q,X) and U1 : (r,s) . (r,s), and its
left adjoint, the free functor F : Set|Set?ASet, which constructs
ASets. The (free, forgetful) adjoint is shown in the following
commutative diagram:
where gQ,X(q,x)~((q, ),x) and, for the instance of interest to us,
(Q,X) and (R,Y) are the (trigram, shape) pairs of sets for the first
and second tasks (respectively), as defined for example in Tables 1
and 2 so that g : NEJ.GUD, r : square . cross, etc. Full
details and a proof that (F,U) is an adjoint functor pair are
provided in Text S1.
Our explanation for systematicity in this domain follows the
now familiar pattern, where monoids model the relationships
between actions in each task instance. (Though our argument
employs monoids, nothing essential changes if instead we use
semigroups, or groups, where for example each task instance is
extended with two additional shapes, one explicitly corresponding
to the identity element, and the other to the remaining element in
the Klein, or cyclic-4 group. For these cases, the proofs of
adjointness can be extended to involve free semigroups and free
groups, respectively.) Given an ASet modelling the first task
instance and an ASet modelling the second task instance, there
is more than one homomorphism from the first to the second, only
some of which afford the correct responses to the stimuli
in the second task instance. For example, one homomorphism
has the following trigram and shape mappings: g’ : NEJ . GUD,
g’ : POB . QAD, g’ : KEF . GUD, g’ : BEJ . QAD, r’ :
square . cross,a n dr’ : circle . cross.B a s i c a l l y ,t h ef i r s t
table collapses to a table with one row and two columns. It is straight
forward to check that it is indeed a homomorphism, for example,
g’0mQ,X(NEJ,circle)~g’(BEJ)~ QAD ~ mR,Y(GUD,cross) ~
mR,Y0(g’,r’)(NEJ,circle). However, this homomorphism does
not yield the correct responses to some of the stimuli in the
second task instance. For example, all predictions to trigrams
REZ and JOQ are no longer possible. Thus, a principled choice is
required to select only those homomorphisms that indeed result
in models for the second task instance. That choice is determined
by (g,r) and the commutative property of the adjunction. That is,
having obtained the first task instance, and given the two
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Table 1. First task instance.
acts-on NEJ POB KEF BEJ
square POB NEJ BEJ KEF
circle BEJ KEF POB NEJ
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000858.t001
Table 2. Second task instance.
acts-on GUD QAD JOQ REZ
cross QAD GUD REZ JOQ
triangle REZ JOQ QAD GUD
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000858.t002
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correspondences between task stimuli, then there is one and only
one homomorphism making the diagram commute, so that
correct responses are obtained from the remaining trials of the
second task instance. And so, systematicity is a necessary
consequence of this adjunction.
Explanatory levels: n-category theory
Some readers may be interested in developing alternatives, or
extensions to existing theories to address the systematicity problem
in light of our explanation, so it is worth formally characterizing
how our approach differs from previous ones. The difference
between our category theory explanation and Classical/Connec-
tionist approaches to systematicity may be characterized as higher-
order versus first-order theories. Category theory also provides a
formal basis for this distinction in terms of more general n-category
theory (see, e.g., [34]). Though the concerns of n-category theorists
go way beyond what we need here, some elementary aspects of the
theory are used to formalize the difference between why our
adjoint functors explanation addresses the systematicity problem
and why the Classical or Connectionist approach does not.
Notice that the definitions of functor and natural transformation
are very similar to the definition of a morphism. In fact, functors
and natural transformations are morphisms at different levels of
analysis: a natural transformation is a morphism one level above
functors as we shall see. For n-category theory, a category such as
Set is a 1-category, with 0-objects (i.e. sets) for objects and 1-
morphisms (i.e. functions) for arrows. A functor is a morphism
between categories. The category of categories, Cat, has categories
for objects and functors for arrows. Thus, a functor is a 2-
morphism between 1-objects (i.e. 1-categories) in a 2-category. A
natural transformation is a morphism between functors. The
functor category, Fun(C,D) of functors from C to D, has functors
for objects and natural transformations for arrows. Thus, a natural
transformation is a 3-morphism between 2-objects (i.e. functors) in
a 3-category. (A 0-category is just a discrete category, where the only
arrows are identities, which are 0-morphisms.) In this way, the
order n of the category provides a formal notion of explanatory
level.
Classical or Connectionist compositionality is essentially a
lower-levels attempt to account for systematicity. For the examples
we used, that level is perhaps best described in terms of a 1-
category. Indeed, a context-free grammar defined by a graph is
modelled as the free category on that graph containing sets of
terminal and non-terminal symbols for objects and productions for
morphisms [31]. By contrast, our category theory explanation
involves higher levels of analysis, specifically functors and natural
transformations, which live in 2-categories and 3-categories,
respectively. Of course, one can also develop higher-order
grammars that take as input or return as output other grammars.
Similarly, one can develop higher-order networks that take as
input or return as output other networks (e.g., networks whose
connectivity is dynamic, such as cascade correlation [35]).
However, the problem is that neither Classical nor Connectionist
compositionality delineates those (higher-order) grammars or
networks that have the systematicity property from those that do
not. Likewise for our category theory explanation, not just any
functor, nor just any natural transformation accounts for
systematicity. If the explanation was left at either of these levels,
then our approach would also succumb to the same problem that
befalls Classicism and Connectionism—i.e. the problem of having
to stipulate, ad hoc, just which functors or natural transformations
account for the systematicity property. Rather, it is a natural
transformation between an identity functor and a composition of
two other functors (F0G) that defines the adjunction that accounts
for systematicity relative to the particular domain of interest. In
this formal sense, a crucial difference is that there is also a
between-levels aspect to our explanation.
Discussion
Our adjoints explanation of systematicity has essentially two
parts: (1) existence, showing how a particular connection between
cognitive capacities is possible from a functorial specification of the
architecture; and (2) uniqueness, explaining why that particular
connection is necessary because it is the one and only one that
satisfies the commutativity property of the adjunction. In contrast,
the Classical and Connectionist explanations only provide an
account of existence, but not uniqueness. That is, some
grammars/networks afford the required intrinsic links between
capacities and some do not, just like some functorial constructions
do and some do not; but, for Classicism or Connectionism, there is
no further explanation determining only those grammars or
networks yielding systematicity (other than by ad hoc assumption),
whereas for the category theory explanation the adjunction
specifies only the systematic functors. So, our explanation meets
the explanatory standard laid out by Aizawa.
To be regarded as a theoretical explanation for systematicity,
such an explanation should be potentially falsifiable. Our
explanation could be challenged by an alternative theory that
accounts for systematicity (without ad hoc assumptions) in a way
that does not require, or implement an adjunction. This possibility
would not falsify our explanation as such, but may provide an
alternative theory that is preferred on other grounds. Alternatively,
there may exist a domain in which humans exhibit systematicity
but for which there does not exist a relevant adjunction. Hence,
the category theory approach we have put forward is in principle
falsifiable.
The unit of an adjunction is a natural transformation between
functors. The sense in which a transformation is natural is that the
transformation does not depend on a particular ‘‘basis’’. A
mathematician’s example is to contrast the dual of a vector space
with the, natural, double dual (dual of the dual) of a vector space—
the former depends on a specific set of basis vectors chosen ad hoc,
the latter does not. The analogue, here, is that our explanation of
systematicity is natural in that it does not depend on a particular
representational scheme (i.e., constituent order for relational
propositions). Hence, the explanation does not depend on ad hoc
assumptions about internal representations. Contrast this expla-
nation with the Classical one, which must assume a particular
grammatical form (e.g., G1 over G2) to fit the data.
In addition to explaining systematicity, our category theory
approach has further implications. According to our explanation,
systematicity with respect to binary relational propositions requires
a category with products. A category theory account has also been
provided for the strikingly similar profiles of development for a
suite of reasoning abilities that included Transitive Inference and Class
Inclusion, among others [30]—all abilities are acquired around the
age of five years. The difference between the difficulties of younger
children and the successes of older children (relative to age five)
across all these reasoning tasks was explained as their capacity to
compute (co)products. (A coproduct is related to a product by arrow
reversal—see, e.g., [28] for a formal definition.) Therefore, our
explanation implies that systematicity is not a property of younger
children’s cognition. Some support for this implication is found on
memory tasks that require binding the background context of
memorized items [36], though further work is needed to test this
implication directly.
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propositions does not depend on Set, it only requires a category
with products. For example, the categories Top of topological
spaces and continuous mappings, and Vec of vector spaces and
linear mappings [21] could also be used. These possibilities imply
that an explanation of systematicity does not depend on a
particular (discrete symbolic, or continuous subsymbolic) repre-
sentational format. Thus, a further benefit is that our approach
opens the way for integration of other (sub/symbolic) levels of
analysis.
Though some effort is needed to provide a category theory
explanation for systematicity, even for a relatively simple domain
such as relational propositions, the potential payoff is that our
explanation generalizes to other domains where an appropriate
adjunction is identified. This sort of tradeoff has been noted
elsewhere in the context of a category theory treatment of
automata [25]. We sketch one possibility in the domain of context-
free grammars. Languages conforming to context-free grammars
can be modelled as the free category on the directed graph that
defines the grammar, whose vertices are sets of terminal and non-
terminal symbols, and edges are transitions [31]. The left adjoint is
the functor F : Grph?Cat from the category of directed graphs
and graph homomorphisms to the category of categories and
functors (category homomorphisms). The right adjoint is the
forgetful functor U : Cat?Grph, which returns the underlying
graph (i.e. the arrows, forgetting their compositions). The
explanation here is analogous to our explanation for relational
schemas. The problem Aizawa raised with respect to Classicism is
avoided here because systematicity is not derived from individual
grammars, but homomorphic relationships between grammars.
Having provided an explanation of systematicity in terms of the
rather abstract category theory concept of adjoint functors, one
may wonder what this explanation means for a more typical
conception of cognitive architecture in terms of internal
representations and processes, and their realization in the brain.
Human cognition is remarkable in that it affords the ability to
think about things that have no sensory access (e.g., ‘‘a dog that is
one lightyear long …’’); yet reason about such entities as if they
were grounded in our everyday experience (‘‘… is smaller than a
dog that is two lightyears long’’). However, these two aspects must
be reconciled: unbridled abstraction means that one can no longer
determine what a particular internal representation is supposed to
refer to; yet blinkering the system with over-narrowly defined
representations curtails one’s ability to think outside the box. These
aspects appear in the form of functors and natural transformations
in category theory. The adjunction is the category theory way of
bringing them into precise ‘‘synchrony’’, or co-ordination, so that
we may think abstractly about very specific things.
The realization of computational processes in the brain is
classically conceived as a physical instantiation mapping from
computational states to brain states, where the syntactic relation-
ships between computational states correspond to physical
relationships between brain states via such maps (see [1], p13).
Category theory affords a similar, but more general and formal
treatment in terms of functors. Diagrams of categories are formally
defined as functors that map graphs (i.e. the shape of the diagram)
to categories (see, e.g., [37]). Analogously, a categorial cognitive
system would involve a functor from a categorial computational
model to a brain system.
Up to this point, we have not considered the relatively new
Bayesian approach to cognitive modelling (see, e.g., [38,39] for
summaries) because, to our knowledge, a Bayesian explanation for
systematicity has not yet been articulated. Nonetheless, the
hierarchical Bayesian approach offers a significant advance with
the ability to learn a diverse range of structures, such as lists, trees,
and other (acyclic or cyclic) graphs, from data [40]. An important
aspect of this approach is that structural form (or the type of
structure) is encoded as prior beliefs by hyperparameters in the
higher layers, and instances of those structures are encoded as
parameters in the lower layers in so far as they conform to the
constraints imposed by the data (environment). In this way, the
architecture is not required to presume one particular structure to
induce a group of behaviours from data. The hierarchical
Bayesian approach affords the sort of higher-order theory that
our analysis in the previous section implies. However, the question
for the Bayesians is essentially the same as for the Classicists and
Connectionists: that is, to articulate the Bayesian architectural
principles from which systematicity necessarily follows. As the
approach currently stands, systematicity depends on a number of
factors including the available data, network connectivity, and
optimization parameters. A Bayesian network with independently
modifiable parameters for representing the distributions of
constituents in each argument position of a relation may not have
the systematicity property in the absence of data with, say, Mary
in the patient position (so called strong systematicity [18]), simply
because there may be no (prior) information available to
determine the value of the associated parameters. Hyperpara-
meters may enable a dependency between lower level parameters
so that the acquisition of one entails the acquisition of another.
Still, systematicity may not necessarily follow from hyperpara-
meters alone: for example, one can envisage a network where
partial hyperparametrization links some but not all behaviours
within the group, analogous to the problem that was raised with
respect to classical compositionality.
All theories make certain assumptions. The question is whether
those assumptions are extrinsic to the theory and carry the
essential explanatory burden (i.e. they are ad hoc). In our case, one
may question whether supposing that an object contains
representations of John and Mary is not itself an ad hoc
assumption, for the Cartesian product does not necessarily
represent all possible combinations of mental representations
[41] (e.g., fJ, Mg|fMg generates representations corresponding
to John loves Mary and Mary loves Mary, but not John
loves John). Our explanation for systematicity of binary
relational propositions is a consequence of the (diagonal, product)
adjoint (Diagram 15), not a specific categorical product. Though
the categorical product is a component of the explanation, the
particular product is derived from the adjunction, not chosen
independently of it. Where the constituent entities are of the same
sort, and so belong to the same object (S) in our theory, the
diagonal functor generates the object pair (S,S), and the product
functor takes (S,S) and generates the product object S|S, hence
cases like fJ, Mg|fMg cannot occur in this formulation. The
assumption that relation symbols belong to a different category
than the related arguments precludes the generation of intrinsi-
cally unconnected cases, such as loves loves loves. Typing,
in this sense, shares some of the explanatory burden, but types are
not extrinsic to our theory. An element cannot exist without
belonging to an object (its type) in a category, by definition. Hence,
types are intrinsic to the theory. Moreover, the explanatory
burden is also born by the adjunction in our example domains.
Even with typing, there must still be a principled choice for the
order of those constituents, when they involve the same objects,
which is provided by the adjunction. And, given that adjunctions
are central to category theory, neither the assumption of types, nor
our use of adjunction can be regarded as ad hoc for the purpose of
explaining systematicity in these domains. Classicism also makes a
distinction between atomic and molecular representations, as a
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are equivalent to ours—John and Mary belong to the same word
classes, which differ from loves—systematicity does not
necessarily follow, as exemplified by grammar G2. Hence, the
critical difference between our explanation of systematicity and the
Classical approach is the adjunction.
This assumption of typing, though, is acute for quasi-systematic
domains, where cognitive capacity may extend to some but not all
possible constituent combinations, which appear to be particularly
prevalent in language (see [41]). For these cases, we would also
need category theory-derived principled restrictions to products.
Equalizers and pullbacks (see [30] for an application to cognitive
development) are two ways to restrict (product) objects, in the
same arrow-theoretic style. Products, pullbacks and equalizers are
all instances of the general, formal concept of a limit in category
theory. The existence of adjoint functors is closely linked to the
existence of limits in the respective categories (cf. adjoint functor
theorems [21], p210–214), which suggests that an appropriate
adjunction can also be found for domains that require an
explanation for quasi-systematicity.
Needless to say, our category theory explanation is not the final
word on a theory of cognitive architecture. For our approach (and
Classicism), where the assignment of elements to objects (and,
words to word classes) is asserted, there is also the broader question
of why they get assigned in a particular way. This question
pertains to the acquisition of representations, whereas the
systematicity problem pertains to their intrinsic connections.
Incorporating category theory into the Bayesian approach may
provide a more integrative theory in this regard. A connection
between category theory and probability has been known for some
time (see [42]), and category theory concepts have been
incorporated into the development of probabilistic functional
programming [43]. A potentially fruitful line of future research,
then, may be to identify a suitable adjunction with respect to, say,
a category of Bayesian models, if such a category exists.
From a category theory perspective, we now see why cognitive
science lacked a satisfactory explanation for systematicity—
cognitive scientists were working with lower-order theories in
attempting to explain an essentially higher-order property.
Category theory offers a re-conceptualization for cognitive science,
analogous to the one that Copernicus provided for astronomy,
where representational states are no longer the center of the
cognitive universe—replaced by the relationships between the
maps that transform them.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Proof that the free and forgetful functors for the
category ASet form an adjoint functor pair.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000858.s001 (0.10 MB PDF)
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